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Trends and Deviations in Federal, State and Local Finance
ABSTRACT
This paper contains a descriptive analysis of real per capita annual
revenues, expenditures1 deficits, debt levels and capital expenditures
for federal, state and local government finance in the United States for
the years 1952—83. It summarizes each time series as a deterministic
trend and an ARIN characterisation of the deviations around trend.
These summaries demonstrate that civil ian capital outlays are fall ing at
an accelerating pace in all levels of government; federal government
expenditures and debt are expanding at an accelerating rate; local
special districts are also growingquadratically;state governments have
a continuing surplus of revenues over expenditures; and local govern-
ments depend upon intergovernmental revenues to maintain balance between
revenues and expenditures while reducing debt. Stochastic persistence
tends to increase at more disaggregate levels of government. Experidi—





New York, NY 10003I. Introduction
This paper contains a descriptive analysis of qovernmeat finance in the
United States for the years 1952—83. It concentrates on three aeneral
aspects offinance;annual revenues, expenditures and deficits; annual
debt chanQes; and annual capital expenditures. It discusses each aspect
for federal, aggreaate state and aQgreaate local oovernments. Thispaper
bases its description on time series data published by the U. S. Census
Bureau1 adjusted to 1972 per capita dollars. It decomposes the time
series representing each aspect of government finance, for each level of
Qovernment, into a deterministic trend and an MRIMA characterisation of
the deviations around trend. It describes these components in terms of
their implications for four issues of public ol icy; fiscal p01
election cycles in government finance, fiscal federalism and 'crises' in
government finance.
This naper serves several purposes. First, it completes the histori-
cal presentation of government finances begun b Fabricant and Copeland.
While these studies concentrated on constructing consistent raw data for
the first half of this century, this uses statistical techniques to
summarize more recent published statistics.
Second. it brinQs a new perspective, throuqh these stat istica1 tech-
niques, to issues which havebeen addressed elsewhere. For exam1e, Goldpresents a discussion and description of state finances in the 'ears
1949—81. Mills presents a description of recent federai budQets.
Mieszkowski and Stein provide a simple causal anayss o-F.aQgreqate
annual state and local expenditures, in the years 1929—32! thrcuqh
simulation of demand for local public services. Iriman, aoain throuQri
simulation, analyzes chanaes in finance •for forty larQe city overrirnents
between 1970 and 1980. This paper describes concisely the recent history
of finance at all levels of government by extractinQ statistical trends
from aQaregate time—series data.
Third, it describes stochastic properties of government finance.
Holtz—Eakin describes these properties in detail for a sample of
municipalities. Ths paper presents them in a consistent format for all
levels of government. These properties, as shown by Ashenfelter and
Card, can serve as persuasive tests between alternative theories of
dynamic behavior. Unfortunately, no dynamic theory of government finance
exists. The stochastic results here, like those of Holtz—Eakin, are
dynamic characterizations with which any intertemporal theory of govern-
ment finance should be consistent.
The descriptions of government finance in this paper reveal several
general observations. State and local governments are trending towards
persistent real per capita surpluses. while the federal government
trends towards persistent deficit. Similarly, real per capita debt 5
trendingdownwards in state and local governments, and uowards for the
federal government. Real er capita capital expenditures are trending
downwards at all levels of government, with the exception of capitaloutlays for defense. Stochastic persistence ofshocksto Qovern(nent
•finance is greater at lower than at higher levels of qovernment.
These descriptions have several implications. The federal government
can potentially exercise effective fiscal oolic on aQQreaate demand!
because the magnitudes of potential unanticipated shocks to federal
deficits are larae relative to the rnaqn,itudes c'f GNPdeviationsfrom
trend. Differences between Federal and state revenues and deficits
become significantly more negative in years which precede a presidential
election. Trends in government finance reveal few, if any, tendencies
towards devolution of government responsibilities from federal to state
and local levels, despite persistent support for 'fiscal federalisrn'
frompoliticiansof many ideological traditions.
ii. Data and Method
The Bureau of the Census collects, through their annual Survey of
Governments and their quinquennial Census of Governments detailed
statistics of government finance. Its publications 1 report the time
series analyzed here; total revenues and expenditures, long—term debt
outstanding and total capital outlays. This paper occasionally discusses
components of these broad measures, taken fromthesamesources.
1
Citations are in the references at the end of this paper.
—3—These series are consistent and complete across time and levels of
government. Their principle de4ect as discussed b Gold and Skaperdas,
is that they do not distinguish between mandatory and discretionary
elements of finance. This is not an important problem For the descrip-
tive presentation inthispaper. However! some of the most interesting
trends discussed below identify divergences in growth rates across
levels of government. The distinction between mandatory and discretion-
ary changes will be important to analytical work devoted to explaining
these divergences.
All time series are in real per capita terms. Federal time series are
deflated by the aggregate implicit price deflator br federal purchases
of goods and services. All state and local time series are deflated b
the aggregate implicit price deflator for state and local purchases.
2
All data are deflated b U.S. population levels in the appropriate year.
The 'trends' referred to throughout this paper are OLS regressions of
government finance variables on a constant a trend and a squared trend
term. In the vocabulary of this paper l inear trends' are series for
which the coefficient on the quadratic term is insignificant or negli-
gible. 'Quadratic trends' are series for which the quadratic term is
significant and the linear term is ofthesame sin4 insignificant! or
negligible of opposite sign. Positive quadratic terms represent ac-
celerating Qrowth! negative terms represent accelerating shrinkage. For
reQressions in which linear and quadratic terms are of opposing sign.
These deflators are ubl shed intheNational Income and Product
Accounts.
—4—years to extrernurir represents the number of Years for which the deriva—
tve of the trend equation with respect to time is euai to zero. The
'deviation time series -for each Qovernrnent finance variable ——the
residuals -from the trend regression ——aresummarized below as
autoregressve—inteorated—rnoving average (AR1M::' models.
III. Revenues1 ExDenditures and Deficits
The discussion in this section analyzes federal, aggregate state and
aggregate local expenditures and revenues. Trends -for the federal
government suggest that expenditures are outgrowing revenues at an
accelerating pace. In contrast! state revenues are outgrowing expendi-
tures at an accelerated rate on all but the most general definitions.
Total local revenues, in particular those of special districts, are
outgrowing expenditures at an accelerated rate, but larqeT on the
strength of intergovernmental transfers. Federal government deviations
from trend exhibit the Jeast stochastic persistence, local government
deviations exhibit the most. Expenditure deviations are more persistent
than those of revenues.
.Trends
Tables 1, 2 arid 3 present the trends in Qovernrnent revenues and expendi—
—5—tures for federal aggrecjate state and aggregate local governments.
respectively. Each table resents results for revenues1 expenditures,
and their difference.These trend estimates suggest that real oer
capita 'qrowth-' inoovernmentis correlated with the level of govern—
rnent. Federal government expenditures and excesses of expenditures over
revenues are growing at quadratic rates. State government expenditures
are growing linearly1 at most1 and are increasinoly exceeded by
revenues. Local government expenditures are growing at decelerating
rates, and are now, or will soon be increasingly exceeded by revenues.
1. Federal Finances
The coefficients in table I yield one general observation with regard to
trends in real cer capita federal finance: the federal government is
growing at an accelerating rate. Federal total revenues and expenditures
have significant positive quadratic terms. The trend difference between
them is also expanding, with expenditures exceeding revenues! at an
accelerating rate.
The differences referred to in these tables are the algebraic
differences between revenue and expenditure time series. Positive
valuesrepresent excesses of revenuesoverexendi tures. negative
values represent the opoosite relationship. The constant and trend
coefficientsinthe difference equations are. byconstruction1
identicalto the differences between constants and coefficients in
the corresponding revenue and expenditure equations. These dif-













Difference, Direct —.249 .22821.7
General Revenue (1.82:)
and Expenditure
Notes: T—statistics are in parentheses.
-I
Though these trends fit the totals well, as demonstrated b their R2,
broad categories of federal activity have very different histories. The
total trends depend on strong trends in revenues and expenditures from
federal trust funds (largely the Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and
Health Insurance (OASDHI) trust), and in transfers to lower levels of
government. Quadratic trends for total general revenues and expenditures
——measureswhich exclude the trusts——achieveR2's of only .45 and
.79, respectively. Direct general expenditures exclude the large amounts
Total general revenues and expenditures also exclude utility and
liquor store transactions. These are much more important for state
and local governments than for the federal government.
—7—
Years to



















58.8of federal transfers to lower governments, as well as the trust transac-
tions.quadratic trend for these expenditures, on federally—provided
services such as national defence, national parks and federal highways,
achieves an R2s of only .38 .
Thesecomparisons imply that trust funds and intergovernmental trans-
fers may play a distinctive role in the growing excess of total expendi-
ture over total revenues. The trend difference between total general
revenues and expenditures, as given in table 1, is similar to that in
the total difference, but has less explanatory power. The trend dif-
ference between direct general revenues and expenditures has even less
explanatory power, but its coefficients are significant. They estimate
that these revenues have exceeded expenditures for most of the sample
period. However, the excess is shrinking at an accelerating rate. They
also predict that Federal direct general expenditures will begin to
exceed direct general expenditures in the early 1990's.
In general, trends predict poorly the differences between federal
revenues and expenditures. However, the large federal deficits of 1983!
1984 and 1985 are surprisingly consistent with estimated trends. 6 These
7
trends underestimate the actual difference in 1983.Of all the sanrnTe
Direct! or own—source, general revenues include only a small quan-
tity of intergovernmental revenues. Their trends are similar to
those in total general revenues.
The estimated quadratic trends for the differences between total
revenues and total expenditures, and between total general revenues
and total general expenditures, are always and increasingly neQa—
t i ye.
7
1983 s the most recent year n the sampie used here.years, the absolute prediction error for total and total general dif-
ferences in 1983 is qreatest. However, the relative prediction error is
small, only 34.5< of the actual difference. Furthermore, differences in
more recent years willprobablylie closer to the trends. Real per
capita deficits have fallen, and the trends predict increasingly neaa—
tive differences.
8
Trends in detailed coriiporientsoffederal revenues and expenditures
reveal shifts in federal activity. mong own—source revenues, total
10
real taxes per capita exhibit no trend at all. Income taxes have a
linear upward trend significant at 10<. In contrast, revenues fromsome
current charges are growing at quadratic rates. Interest earnings are
also growing at quadratic rates, but so are interest payments. Trends in
net interest earnings are negative throughout the sample period, and
increasingly so.
Trends in components of federal expenditures provide even more
dramatic contrasts. Expenditures for administration (general control and
financial administration), 'law and order' <police protection and cor—
B
The Economic Report of the President, 1986 reports federal deficits
in current dollars of $207.8 billion in 1983, $185.3 in 1984, *212.3
bill ion in 1985. estimated $202.8 bill ion in 1986 and estimated
$143.6 billion in 1987 (Table B—73). t4ith modest inflation and
population growth, real per capita deficits in these years would not
exceed that of 1983.
The Census Bureau publishes data for detailed federal components
beginning in 1958. Trend estimates for these series and for all
series not reported in full are available from the author.
10 2
R =.07 for the regression at real taxes per capita on a constant,
trend and trend squared. The constant in this equation is equal to
$618, significant at SX.
—9—rection) and oublic welfare (categorical and other cash assistance, and
other welfare expenditures) all follow trends with significant positive
ouadratic terms. However, expenditures for all forms cf tr.nspartation
( including highways) are fall ing at quadratic rates. Expenditures on
health are either growino linearly (hospitals) or at a decelerating cace
(health and social insurance administration). Expenditures on national
defense and international relations are also growing linearly. Expendi-
tures on eduction, for the most part, have not trended significantly.
2. State Finances
Trends in aggregate state real per capita revenues and expenditures.
presented in table 2, embody distinct contrasts to federal trends. These
trends predict state finances ——againas measured b' ——muchbetter
than they do federal finances. Generally, they demonstrate that growth
in state governments is entirely linear. The few significant quadratic
trends all indicate decelerating growth in expenditures and acceler-at—
ing excesses of revenues over expenditures.
Specifically3 the difference between total state revenues and total
state expenditures is negi igble, and displays no trend. Neglecting
insurance trusts, utilities and liquor stores, the trend difference
between total general revenue and total general expenditures has been























Notes: T—statisticsare in parentheses.
11 the series. Own—source general revenue has always exceeded direct
general expenditures, by increasing amounts since about 1958, the sixth
1' year of the series.
11
Trends in components of state finance demonstrate striking corn—
This difference was negative between years 13 and 24 of the series,
or approximately between 1965 and 1976. The largest deficit occurred
in year 18, or approximately 1970.
12
The National Income and Product Accounts confirm the recent fiscal
strength of state and local governments. They report a record
nominal surplus for combined state and local governments in 1983,
using standard measures, and a relatively large surplus when ad-








.945 Total General 201. 9.55 .0723
Revenue (12.7) (4.32) (1.11)
Total General 152. 15.5 —.0889











13.7parisons to those in components of federal finance. The sources of state
revenue growth are opposite to those of growth in federal revenues.
However federal and state allocations of expenditure growth are broadly
similar.
Total state tax revenues, and general sales taxes, are growing
linearly. The trend in income taxes is positive and quadratic. Net
interest is also positive, and groting. Charges are growing along a
decelerating trend which predicts an end to growth in approximately a
decade. The trends in motor fuel and motor vehicle tax revenues have
been falling for nearly twenty years.
State expenditures on general control and financial administration,
and all forms of public welfare display significant positive quadratic
trends. Expenditures for pol ice and correction are growing linearly.
Expenditures for hospitals and health expenditures are also growing,
more vigorously than at the federal level. State expenditures on all
forms of transportation peaked in the last decade, and are now declin-
ing. State education expenditures, which are growing on a trend that is
set to peak in the next decade, are the only expenditure component for












































































Notes: T—statistics are in parentheses.
Table 3 presents the trends in aQreQate real per capita local Qovern—
ment finance. in contrast to federal and state governments. the dominant
—13—observation here is that, if anything, trends in local finance are
towards shrinkage. All measures of local revenues and exenditures, with
the exception of total general revenues, have siQnificant neqative
quadratic trends which eventually imply reductions.
However, shrinkage is. for the most aart. a prediction of these
trends, rather than an experience within the sample period. As olven in
table3, total eneral revenues and expenditures have iarge, sig-
nificantly positive linear terms. Despite the significant negative
quadratic term for expenditures, these equations predict continued
revenue and expenditure growth well beyond the sample period.
Eauations for differences, presented in table 3, indicate that local
governments, in the aggregate, appear to be moving into a period o4
relative financial ease. This ease may be precarious, however. It
depends entirely on transfers from federal and state governments. Of all
local government revenue sources, these are least within the their
control
According to the estimated trend, the difference between total
revenues and total expenditures has been positive and growing with
increasing rapidity since &pproximately 1980. Thismayactuail under—
state the sufficiency of total revenues. Disregarding the insignificant
linear trend, the equation predicts excesses beginning as early as 1974.
Equations for total revenue, total expenditures and direct oeneral
expenditures are similar.
—1 —
STrend differences between total aeneral revenues and total Qeneral
expenditures have been positive since approximately 1975, as well.
Intergovernmental revenues play an important role in these corn—
parisons.
14
The trend difference between own—source general revenues
and direct general expenditures does not include them, is negative, and
growing. Accepting the insignificant quadratic term, the excess of
direct general expenditures over own—source revenues will grow through
the first sixty—one years of the series. Neglecting this term, the
excess increases linearly. This trend indicates that own—source revenues
are increasingly inadequate support for the central functions of local
15
government.
Trends in local government revenue components demonstrate these
inferences explicitly. Transfers from federal to local governments are
growing quadratically. Growth in state transfers is slowing but
projected to continue for another 25 years. Utility revenues are also
increasing at quadratic rates. However, property taxes! traditionally
the most important own—source revenue, are deci ining. The trend in
property tax revenues peaked a decade ago. In another decade the trend
14
Census Bureau sectoral data ignore ntrasectaral transfers. For
example, transfers from counties to cities ——whichcreate identical
additions to gross local intergovernmental revenues and gross local
intergovernmental expenditures ——arenetted out of published local
intergovernmental totals.
15
This analysis does not, of course, discriminate between two possible
explanations: Intergovernmental revenues may be essential! because
local resources are fundamentally inadequate. However, local govern-
ments may choose not to tap underutilized local revenue sources,
because intergovernmental revenues are available.
—15—will imply real per capita property tax revenues no greater than those
of 1952. Among own—source revenues! trends n sales taxes and charges
are positive.
The trends in components of local government expenditures are oc-
casionally at variance to those in state and federal governments. As at
higher levels, expenditures on health and hospitals, police and correc-
tion, general control and financial administration are increasing.
However, local expenditures on all categories Qf welfare are decreasing,
beginning approximately ten years ago. Local school and library expendi-
tures are following a similar pattern, with the exception of expendi-
tures on higher education. Expenditures on many purely local functions,
such as fire, sanitation and sewerage, are increasing.
Of the different types of local governments, counties,
municipalities, townships, special districts and school districts con—
form to the aggregate trends of table 3 during the years 1964—83.
However! the aggreQate of special districts is growing. As given in that
table, both linear and quadratic trends are positive for total general
revenues and direct general expenditures. t4ith the exception of the
quadratic trend in expenditures, all are signilicant. These equations
imply that the difference between special district total general revenue
and direct general expenditure has been positive and growing for over
16
Total direct revenues 4or local governments include important net
intergovernmental revenues. Direct general expenditures for local
governments neglect only negligible net intergovernmental expendi-
tures. Comparisons between the two are, therefore, reasonable in-
dications of actual budget conditions.
—16—ten years.
B. Trend Irnplicatons
These trends summarize accurately the history of government finances
between 1952 and 1983. Their irnplications may encourage pol icy changes
which ensure that future trends are different. In particular, transfers
from the federal government are essential to the apparent 'health' of
local qovernments, and contribute to that of state governments. In the
current circumstances! federal government officials might be tempted to
reduce transfers to state and local governments in order to limit or
reduce federal deficits (Skaperdas).
These trends contain implications for three other policy issues. They
provide a crude index of the scope for countercycl ical fiscal pol icr; a
simple test of the existence of electoral cycles in government finance
and descriptive measures of 'fiscal federal ism' ——theextent to which
government responsibilities and revenue sources have been reallocated
across government levels.
1. Fiscal Policy
The trends estimated above orovideusefulindicationsofthe scope for
—17—Table 4.
Averae Federal Real Per
Capita Differences, 1952—1983
FederalDifferences
Total Revenues Total General Revenues Direct General Revenues
and Expenditurs and Expenditures and Expenditures
—72,60 —53.16 67.40
countercyclicalqovernrnent fiscal policy. Table 4 presents mean dif—
ferences between real per capita revenues and expenditures for the
federal government during the years 1952—83, using all three total
concepts. These differences are quite small in comparison to I3NP.The
—$72.60 per capita mean difference between federal total revenues and
total expenditures, the largest, is only 1.4< of mean real per capita
GNP ($5276.40) during this period. However, iftheeffective element of
fiscal policy is unanticipated deficits, and the appropriate target is
unanticipated deviations of GNP from trend (Barro), this comparison is
not conclusive.
The estimates of table 1 demonstrate that a large proportion of
federal deficits can be 'anticipated' merely from simple trends.
Residual federal differences net of trends, are simple approximations
of unanticipated' deficit components. The detrended variance of Qovern—
rnentdeficits,relative to the detrended variance of GNP,isacrude
—18 —17
approximation to the correct comparison.
For the years studied here, 1952 through 1983, real per capita gross
national product has a substantial trend component. R4=.957 for a
regression of real per capita gross national product on a trend and a
squared trend.
18
The residual standard error of this equation, in 1972
dollars, is $195.40. As reported in table 1, the residual standard error
of the difference between federal total revenues and expenditures is
equal to $54.45. The standard error in this measure of the tederal
deficit is more than a quarter of that in detrended GNP. Reasonable
unanticipated changes in federal deficits, in combination with
reasonable macroeconomic multipliers, can produce deviations in GNP
around trend that are relatively large.
2. Election Cycles
If macroeconomic outcomes are sensitive to government fiscal pa1 icy,
incumbent politicians may be able to manipulate macroeconomic variables
in order to produce circumstances Favorable to reelection. Hanipulations
17
This approximation should be taken only as illustrative. Detrended
GNPandfederal deficit series provide only 'upper bounds' on the
'unanticipated' components of these series. More sophisticated time
series or causal models would presumably reduce the residual
variances in both.
18
The dependent variable in this equation is gross national product,
deflated b implicit price deflator and U. S. population, 1952—83.
The estimated equation, with t—statistics in parentheses, is
Real per capita GNP3759 +89.0(trend)+.276(squaredtrend).
(34.1) (5.57) (.607)
—19-of this sort would produce a political business cycle coinciding with
the chronology of government elections. Previous studies have produced
confl icting theories with reQard to the possibil it>' of such cycles, as
well as confi icting evidence with reaard to their existence. When ex-
panded, the simple trend analyses above demonstrate that, as an empiri-
cal matter, federal and state revenues fall relative to expenditures in
years preceding federal elections.
Policy—induced business cycles could be a successful political
strategy if either the electorate is myopic (Nordhaus, MacRae) or if it
suffers information asymmetries under rational expectations (Rogaff and
Sibert). Nordhaus and MacRae present empirical evidence that unemploy-
ment cycles coincide with federal elections. However, this strategy
would be futile if fiscal po1 icy is ineffective; McCallum presents
evidence that unemployment is insensitive to election schedules. It
would also be futile if the electorate does not care about macroeconomic
outcomes; presidential popularity ratings appear to be insensitive to
macroeconomic outcomes Golden and Poterba).
The evidence for election cycles in macroeconomic outcomes is mixed.
The existence of cycles in fiscal policy instruments is, logically, a
prior question. Here, previous evidence is negative. Dummy variables for
year in the federal election c>'cle do not contribute significantly to
the explanatory power of equations for quarterly federal deficits which
include other macroeconomic and political variables (Golden and
Poterba). This evidence is not conclusive, because the regression
specification includes the macroeconomic targets of election c'cle
—20—fiscal strategy amongtheexplanatory variables for the election cycle
fiscal instrument. In contrast, regressions which include only trends,
squared trends and dummyvariablesfor years prior to the years in which
federal elections are held do not identify causal ity, but do provide
strong evidence that federal and state fiscal deficits are sensitive to
e 1 ec t I on schedules.
The impact of election cycles on federal government finances is
increasing. Coefficients on a trending dummy
19
are negative, sig-
nificant at 10Y for the differences between total and total general
revenues and expenditures, and at 5/ for the difference between own—
source general revenues and direct general expenditures.
20These coef—
ficients indicate that the year before each successive election reduces
the total difference by an additional $7.44, the total general dif-
ference by $7.11, and the direct general difference by $9.72 per capita.
in 1983, the eighth pre—election year in the sample period, these reduc-
tions amounted to $59.52, $56.88 and $77.76 per capita, respectively.
The preelection effect on total and total general differences in that
year was equivalent to the average excess of total and total general
expenditures over revenues, as given in table 4. The effect on the
trending dummy is the interaction between the standard dummy and
the trend. In the year prior to a federal election year, it takes on
the value of the trend. In all other years, it takes on the value of
zero.
20
The coefficients on a conventional dummy variable reoresenting years
before federal election years are negative for the differences
between all three revenue and expenditure measures, but significant
at 10> or less. Coefficients on both the dummy and the trending
dummy are negative in revenue equations and positive in expenditure
equations, but significant only in equations for the differences.
Trend and squared trend coefficients are unaffected b the inclusion
of either.
—direct general difference more than negated the mean surplus at that
level.
The preelection effect on state finances has been also been sig-
nificant, but stable. Coefficients on a conventional dummy variable are
negative and significant at 5 for all three difference measures. This
is the on)>' variable that has a significant effect on the difference
21
between total revenues and expenditures. These coefficients indicate
that years prior to federal elections reduce state total, total general
and own—source surpluses by 315.13, 311.34 and $8.98 per capita, respec-
tively. These reductions are 82.2, 125Y. and 22.9'. of mean surpluses as
given in table 4.
The descriptive evidence in these regression coefficients does not
demonstrate that fiscal policy actually induces political business
cycles or that political business cycles are effective electoral
strategy. However, it is consistent with the suggestion that incumbent
politicians manipulate fiscal policy in order to imProve electoral
prospects. Deficits in years prior to federal elections are large for
both federal and state governments. Coefficients on dummy variables for
other years in the federal election cycle are uniformly insignificant.
Qgregate local government finances are unaffected by the federal e)ec—
tion cycle, presumably because individual local government elections
21gain, the inclusion of either the dummy or the trending dummy
leaves trend coefficients unaltered. The dummy variable also nd—
cates a Dreelection year reduction in state total revenues S1Q—
nificantat iO7. Coefficients on the trendng dumrn::/ far areelection
years are negative, but significant at only iU7 -for the three
deficit measures.
—take place in all years. More appropriate measures of election chronol—
oqyrniQht revealfiscaleffectsat this level! aswell.
3.Fiscal Federalism
In the U. S. federal system, qovernment services can be provided! and
public revenues collected, at any of three levels. Service at any level
of government depends on service provision, service mandates and sup-
porting grants from higher levels of government (ACIR, Craig and Inman).
Responsibilities and revenue sources may be shifted among federal, state
and local governments for three reasons. Theoretically, changes in the
publicness and congestibility of public services may change the level of
government from which provision is optimal. Ideologically, 'fiscal
federalism' embodies an imperative to allocate services to the most
local Jurisdiction.practicable. Practically, and probably most compell-
ingly, higher, general purpose Jurisdictions shift responsibilities to
more local or more specialized jurisdictions when they can no longer
afford to support them (Copeland, pg. xxiv).
Despite changes in the technologies, ideologies and practicalities of
government administration, trends in the components of federal, state
and local revenues and expenditures reveal few shifts in the allocations
of either across government levels. Growth within particular expenditure
or revenue categories is often in the same direction at all levels of
government. Changes occur in expenditure or revenue shares over time,
but are more likely to derive from variations in growth rates rather
—23—than differences in growth directions.
Intergovernmental transfers are the most obvious connection between
different government levels. The revenue—sharing aspect of 'fiscal
federalism' has become more important over the sample period. State
intergovernmental revenues have grown at a decelerating rate, on a trend
which predicts that growth will end in the year 2000. Local inter-
governmental revenues are growing linearly, mainly on the strength of
transfers from the federal government.
Among most important own—source revenue categories, trends are
predominantly towards continued sharing among government levels, rather
than unique assignments. Income tax revenues are increasing at all
levels, though at quadratic rates for state governments. Charges are
also increasing at all levels, though here estimated trends predict that
state revenues will cease to grow after 1992. General sales tax revenues
are increasing for state and local governments.
22
The property tax is the only major own—source revenue for which
revenue trends move in different directions at different levels of
government. Local property tax revenues have been decreasing at a Quad-
ratic rate since approximately 1972. State property tax revenues have
grown at a linear rate over the sample period. However4 this contrast is
not as strong as it appears. The time series of state property tax
revenues is poorly explained by a trend and squared trend (R.41) and
22The federal government does not levy general sales taxes.
—24—state revenues have always been small.
The contrast is more compelling for net interest revenues. They are
growing for state and local governments, and falling for the federal
government. Of course, these trends are the product of practical
problems in government finance, not the programmatic irnpl ications of
fiscal federal ism.
The •fiscal 'federalism policy implies greater specialization in serv-
ices than in revenue collection. Expenditures in three major categories
have been substantially reallocated. However, only the change in non—
highway transportation finance is consistent with the directions dic-
tated by this policy. Federal and state expenditures for non—highway
(air and water. transportation services have been decreasing at a quad-
ratic rate for nearly twenty years. Local expenditures are increasing at
a linear rate. This shift is consistent with increased local autonomy.
In contrast, welfare and education expenditures have shifted away
from local governments, and against the direction dictated by fiscal
federalism. The shift in welfare expenditures is probably in the service
of increased efficiency. Welfare expenditures by local governments are
decreasing, while those of state and federal governments are increasing.
Welfare provision at higher government levels minimizes adverse selec-
tion problems; local provision may induce client and taxpayer migrations
that penalize generous jurisdictions. Federal responsibility for educa-
tion is also increasing. Federal education expenditures have no trend.
while state and local expenditures are trending downwards.
—25—In all other expenditure categor;es, trends areinthe same direction
across all three levels of government. In all, e>penditures on Qeneral
administration, financial control4 police, hospitals and health have
been growing. Federal, state and local highway expenditures are trending
downwards.
C. Stochastic Deviations From Trends
The trend regressions discussed above do not exhaust the explanatory
power of simple, non—causal statistical models. ARIMA models summarize
conveniently the dynamic properties of deviations from trends. These
properties are useful in prediction, but they may be most important as
the interternporal 'facts' with which dynamic theories of government
finance should be consistent.
fpresentationof these facts for the purpose of testing such
theories is premature, since none exist. Rather, this presentation
should encourage experiments in the theoretical treatment of intertem—
poral public finance. There are two general themes: Stochastic persist-
ence is inversely related to the level of government. 'Persistence here
has two meanings; dynamic structures of trend deviations in lower levels
of government include more lagged terms, and lag coefficients tend to
have higher jalues. In addition, ARIM models for deviations from exoen—
diture trends require more lags than do those or revenue deviations.Table 5.
ARIMAModelsfor Federal, State
and Local Total General Revenue and
Expenditure Trend Residuals 1952—83
Deviations from trends for federal, state and local total general



































































presented in table 5. With the exception offederaltotal general
revenues, these models substantially augment the predictive power ofthe
trends regressions. They reduce residual standard errors by ap-
proximately 40—65Y., in comparison to those given in tables 1 —3for
original deviation series.
These models demonstrate that stochastic persistence is greater for
revenue measures at lower than at higher levels of government. First lag
coefficients increase in magnitude fromfederal,to state to local
governments. In addition, local government revenues include a second
lag. Federal total general revenue deviations are an AR(1) with first
lag coefficient significantly less than one. State deviations are also
an AR(1). However, the first lag coefficient is greater than that of the
federal series. One is Just within the upper boundary of its confidence
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interval
23ARI1 models for federal total and direct general revenues and
expenditures are similar to the total general models presented here.
Models of these measures for state and local governments differ from
those for total general revenues and expenditures, but are neverthe-
less consistent with the conclusions drawn below.
Uniquely, trend deviations for virtually all individual federal
revenue sources are also AR<1). Those for income taxes other taxes
and total current charges have first lag coefficients of magnitudes
similar to that for total general revenue. Stochastic behaviors of
individual state and local government revenue sources, and of in-
dividual expenditure categories at all levels of government, are
much more heterogeneous.
Firstdifferences ofboth these series are white noise, but have
higher residual standard errors than the series reported here.
—28 —Local total revenue deviations are an MR(2). —Thefirst lag coeffi'-
cierrt in this model is greater than one, though not significantly so.
First lag coefficients for total general expenditure models are
equivalent across government levels. However, state and local models
require two more lags than does the model for federal expenditures.
Trend deviations for federal total general expenditures are an AR(2),
with first lag coefficient approximately equal to one. Deviations for
state and local revenues are AR(3) in first differences. These models
imply a coefficient of one on the first lag in the undifferenced series.
In addition, they require four lags in the undifferenced series, in
contrast to the two lags of the federal model.
Regardless of government level, models for total general expenditure
are more persistent than models for total general revenues. At any
level, expenditure models require more lags in the original, undif—
ferenced series than do revenue models. In addition, first lag coeffi-
cients are larger for expenditure than for revenue models in federal and
Longer lags may be a stochastic artifact of aggregation. Ii time
series for revenues of individual local governments have their own
stochastic behavior, the characteristics of these series constrain
the stochastic properties of aggregate local government revenues. As
an example, the sum of two AR models is an auto—regressive moving—
average <ARMA) model with autoregressive order equal to the sum of
the two individual autoregressive orders, and with moving average
order equal to the maximum of the two (Harvey1 pg. 43).
'6 2 *Thismodel is stable, but has complex roots; +4< O where
is the coefficient on the first lag, •,thaton the econd. Most
AR2) models reported here with first rder coefficient of ap-
proximately one or greater, and second order coefficient, negative
and of smaller magnitude, have acceptable representations as
ARMA(1,1). First differences are often white noise, but with higher
standard errors.
—29-state models, and of approximately equal magnitudes for local models.
Table 5 demonstrates that stochastic behavior is more oersistent
state finances than for federal, and for local finances than for those
of states. Lag structures are typically longer for expenditure measures
than for corresponding revenue measures. These differences may be the
products of aggregation, differences in electoral processes, in budget
practices or in the formation of expectations at each level of govern-
ment. Theoretical models of these aspects of public finance can be
tested, in part, by their consistency with these facts.
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IV. Debt and Capital SpendinQ
Changes in government debt and capital spending are dependent on, and
components of, changes in government revenues and expenditures.
Nevertheless, they both represent important issues for public pol icy1 in
their own rights. These summaries demonstrate that state and local
government debt burdens are falling. Real per capita government debt is
grot4ing only at the federal level. However, the adequacy of Amer icas
public infrastructure may be at risk. Real per capita non—defense capi—
27
The efficacy of fiscal po1 tcy and the frequency of budget crises may
depend, in part, upon contrasting stochastic behavior in revenue,
expenditure and GNPtrenddeviations. These dependencies could be
explored in vector autoregressions if the relevant time series were
sufficiently long. The thirty—two years analyzed here contain too
few degrees of freedom to estimate such models.
—30 —tal outlays are fall in at all levels of Qovernment.
.Debt
Local government debt levels have been a popular issue of concern since
the 1974 financial difficulties of New York City. Continuing concern
would be misplaced, because local government real per capita debts have
been fall ing at an accelerating pace since approximately that time. In
the past decade, it might better have been directed at state debt
levels, which have only recently ceased to grow. Now, however, changes
in the federal real per capita debt level are, and promise to continue
to be, most alarming. Real per capita 'guaranteed' debt levels are
growing only for the federal government. Debt levels for counties and
special districts are also growing, but probably through increases in
nonguaranteed debt only.
Table 6 presents regression coefficients for trend and squared trend
terms on real per capita gross long—term debt outstanding for federal,
aggregate state and aggregate local governments. The contrasts between
levels of debt at different levels of government are evident. Real er
capita debt has been deci ining at an accelerating pace in local govern-
ments since approximately 1970. State debt is still growing, but should
peak and then fall, beginning in approximately 2000. Federal debt
reached a minimum in approximately 1980, and is now growing at an ac—
—31—Table 6.
Trend Coefficients for Federal,
State and Local Gross Long—Term
Debt Outstanding. 1952—1983
Residual
Trend 2Years to Standard
Constant TrendSquared R ExtremurnError
Federal 3610. —121. 2.52 .94724.0 99.1
(64.4) (15.5) (11.0)
State 101. 8.68 —.0908 .97847.8 8.34
(21.4) (13.2) (4.68)
Local 312. 22.3 —.582 .89219.2 19.3
(28.7) (14.7) (13.0)
Notes: T—statistics are in parentheses.
-4
celerating rate.
Trends in state and local government debt levels are even less dis-
turbing when they are disaggregated by type of debt.
28
State and local
short—term debt levels have been shrinking for a decade or more.
Guaranteed, or full faith and credit debt ——debtsupported by a
jurisdiction's general tax revenues ——inlocal governments began to
fall at the same time. It has recently peaked for state governments.
Revenue, or nonguaranteed debt ——debtbacked only by the future
revenues of the project it finances ——isresponsible for any tendency
towards growth in local government debt, and the remaining growth in
that of state governments.
28
The Census Bureau reports only gross long—term debt outstanding for
the federal government.
—32—Table 7.
ARIWModelsfor Federal State and




At Lag dual on Lags to
1 2 S.E. 6 12
Federal —1.18 —.423 67.6 .565 .766
6.24) (2.23)
State —.752 —.442 6.53 .517 .558
(4.42) (2.58)
Local —1.24 —.634 11.8 .761 .451
(8.65) (4.43)
Notes T—statistics are in parentheses.
Table 7 presents ARIMA characterizations of deviations from debt
trends. Deviations from trends in debt for all levels of government are
consistent with similar second—order moving averages, MA(2). These
models reduce residual standard errors by 22—39. Most components of
state and local debt are autoregressions with one or two lags, fre-
quently representable as first differences.
The trends in table 8 demonstrate that tendencies toward growth in
local government debt during the period 1964—83 are located entirely in
counties and special districts. In both; debt is growing at an ac-
celerating rate. This growth is probably not a threat to the fiscal
health of special districts; as it must legally be in revenue bonds
backed by dedicated revenue sources. If growth in county government debt
—33—Table B.
Trend Coefficients for Levels
of Local Government Long—Term
Debt OutstandinQ, 1964—1983
Residual
Trend Years to Standard
Constant TrendSquared R ExtremurnError
Counties 51.1 .222 .0725 .906 — 3.59
(19.1) (.380) (2.67)
Municipalities 234. —1.77 —.0346 .898 5.28
(59.5) (2.05) (.868)
Townships 13.9 —.244 —.00203 .874 — .680
(27.4) (2.20) (.395)
Special Districts 117. —2.01 .148 .718 6.8 5.25
(29.8) (2.34) (3.73)
School Districts 132. —1.09 —.157 .990 — 2.76
(64.2) (2.42:> (7.52)
Notes: T—statistics are in parentheses.
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includes growth in guaranteed debt, counties max encounter financial
difficulties. s discussed above, their revenues are shrinking at a
quadratic rate. In contrast, municipal, township and school district
debt levels have fallen continuously. The decline in school district
debt is accelerating.
These trends identify important changes, consistent with the themes
identified by Copeland, in the allocation of responsibilities across
levels of government. General—purpose local governments have, iroart,
recovered from the debt 'criss of the early 1970's by transferring
debt and debt—funded projects to special districts. The increasing
The Census Bureau does not report type of debt by type of local
government.
-34-burden of federal debt may eventually encouraqe the federal aovernment
to perform an analoqous transfer; to abandon its traditional role as
donor in the exchanqe of intergovernmental transfers, and require state
and local governments to maintain services out of own—source revenues.
B. Capital SpendinQ
Statistical descriptions of government capital spending are in distinct
contrast to those of debt. Trends in debt differ across levels of
government, but stochastic models of trend deviations are similar.
Trends in capital outlays are similar, but dynamic behavior of trend
deviations varies. The implications of these comparisons are unfavorable
to capital spending. While 'crises' in debt seemed restricted to the
federal government and perhaps, counties, crises in capital formation
may be endemic.
Table 9 presents trend regressions for real per capita capital outlay
at various levels of government from 1952 through 1983. Total federal
capital outlays are unique; they are currently growing at a quadratic
rate, having reached a minimum in approximately 1977. However, this
growth is entirely due to capital outlays on defense, which average
82.5Y of the total. The trend in civilian federal capital outlays is
identical to those in aggregate state and aggregate local outlays;
-35—accelerated decline from a peak reached around 1970.
30
Broadly, these trends are replicated in category—specf Ic capital
expenditures. Among federal capital expenditures, only those for high-
ways are increasinQ. Utilities are the only functions of local aovern—
ment for which the trend in capital expenditures is significantly posi-
tive. Captial expenditures on all other functions in these governments,
and on all state government functions, are now trending downward.
Table 10 presents ARIMA models for deviations from capital outlay
Hulten and Peterson report similar trends for the aQaregate state
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ARIMA Models for Federal, State and
Local Total Capital Outlays 1952-82




At Lag on Lags to
2 3 6 12
.522 .378 .510 .333
(2.81:)(2.01)
- — .832 .728
.125 .372
.579 .514
trends. As with debt, these deviations are best represented as moving
averages. Trend deviations of total federal outlays conform to an MA(4)
in first differences which explains little of the deviation variance.
The unsatisfactory properties of this model are entirely the fault of
defense outlays; federal civilian outlays are white noise in first
differences. Among civil ian federal, state and local outlays, the number
of significant lags increases as government becomes more local. These
three models account for 25—37< of the deviation standard errors.
The trends in per capita government capital outlays conform better to
conventional wisdom than do any others presented in this paper; civil ian
capital outlays began a universal decline soon after 1970. They may be


















Local —.521 .702 1.12
(9.27) (10.13) (18.00)
Notes T—statistics are in parentheses.
asterisk (*) are in first differences.
Equations marked with anreductions in debt levels discussed above may be oartiy resonsible 'for
reduced capital expenditures.
The state and local trends are also a contrast to trends 'from 1900—
55. During that period, the 'federal share in national debt increased
much more rapidly than did the 'federal share in national tangible assets
(Kuznets, in the 'forward to Copeland). The comparison between recent
trends in Federal debt and capital outlay is similar. However, in the
earlier period state and local governments increased their share o4
tangible assets while reducing their share o'f debt. Currently! debt
levels are 'fall ing but capital outlays are, i'f anything! 'falling 'faster.
Hul ten and Peterson discuss some o'f the conditions, such as overin—
vestinen t in long—lived cap i tal ,underwh I ch secular deci i nes in cap i tal
expenditures are acceptable public poi icy. 14 these conditions are not
currently being met, the trends in government capital outlays imply
'future di4'ficulties in the provison o-fpublicservices.
V. Conclusion
The descriptive regressions and ARIMA models presented here summarize
concisely the important developments in government flnance during the
years 1952 through 1983. Amongthesecular themes which emerge, -Hue are
preeminent. First, civilian capital outlays are 'falling at an accelerat—
- —ing pace in all levels of government. Second1 federal government expen-
ditures are expanding at an accelerating rate, presumably fueled by
similarly rapid growth in federal debt. Third4 local special districts
are also growing quadratically, again fueled by debtq butdebtwhich is
probablyrevenue bonded rather than guaranteed. Fourth, state govern—
rnents, in aggregates have a healthy and continuing surplus of revenues
over expenditures. Fifth local governments depend upon intergovernrnen—
tal revenues to maintain balance between revenues and expenditures while
reducing debt.
Deviations from these trends conform to three stochastic themes.
Stochastic persistence tends to increase at more disaggregate levels of
government. Expenditures tend to have longer lags than do revenues.
Revenues and expenditures are typically autoregressions, while debt
levels and capital outlays are typically moving averages.
These findings demonstrate that important interternporal changes occur
in levels and distribution of government economic activity. Yet no
theory of public finance addresses the intertemporal structure of
government of public finance addresses the intertemporal structure of
government activity so as to predict them. The secular and stochastic
'facts' established here are sufficiently interesting to justify new
efforts to develop such a theory, and sufficiently complete to serve as
initial tests.
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